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Whilst banks are exposed to sovereign risk, sovereigns are exposed to bank risk. This Work 
Project investigates the linkage between both, i.e., the sovereign-bank nexus. Focusing on a 
sample of 11 European countries during 2014-2020, evidence supporting a positive response of 
banks’ home country sovereign debt holdings to increases in sovereign bond spreads and 
decreases in profitability is presented. It is also shown that banks’ solvency over this period 
was connected to their home country sovereign bond spreads. Lastly, adding a sample of 40 
banks, it is confirmed that the sovereign-bank linkage was still in place during the 2017-2020 
period. 
 







A major enhancer of the European sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012) was the tight 
connection between national governments and the banking sector, the so-called sovereign-bank 
nexus. Supported by this linkage, sovereigns and banks reciprocally weakened each other 
causing the ongoing financial crisis to escalate into a sovereign debt crisis. In particular, banks’ 
home country sovereign debt rising exposures played a key role in exacerbating the mutual 
enfeeblement. Figure A1 shows the increasing banks’ domestic sovereign debt exposures of 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) from 2008 to 2012. On the one hand, in 
parallel with the financial crisis, governments were called to support their national financial 
systems, overburdening public finances in several countries. On the other hand, the 
considerable amount of domestic sovereign debt in banks’ balance sheets passed on the 
weaknesses of the public finances, amplifying the fragilities of the banking system while 
concerns about the solvency of European banks were growing. Furthermore, the vulnerabilities 
were exacerbated by the rise of the funding costs for both sovereigns and banks as well as for 
non-financial corporations. In particular, yield spreads to the German bond of the GIIPS 
remarkably widened, portraying the doubts regarding debt repayment. Figure A2 shows the 
upward movement of the sovereign bond yields for the GIIPS in comparison to the German 
bond yield during the peak of the crisis. These issues did not remain inside borders and the 
spillover effects and contagion are nowadays still part of the agenda of policy makers.  
Since the outbreak of the last European crisis, stabilizing the financial system and 
reinstalling credibility became a priority. The European Union (EU) responded by creating a 
banking unit, the European Banking Union, which currently has two established pillars - the 
single supervisory mechanism (SSM) and the single resolution mechanism (SRM). The 
completion of the banking union is dependent on a third pillar, the European deposit insurance 
scheme (EDIS). Considering the concerns related to the heterogeneity across national banking 
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sectors, in particular, due to risk asymmetries inherent to the exposure of national banking 
sectors to their own national sovereigns, this third step has not been taken (Véron, 2017). The 
single rulebook ensures a consistent application of the EU banking rules. Considering that 
supervision, resolution and funding were aligned at the European level, the emergence of the 
European Banking Union was a key step towards a truthful Economic and Monetary Union. 
Nonetheless, banks and sovereigns are still linked through their holdings of sovereign debt and 
the domestic economy, which compromises the progress in reducing the sovereign-bank nexus.  
The current prudential treatment of sovereign debt does not directly address the home bias 
of banks’ debt portfolios or incentivize banks to diversify their sovereign exposures. Instead, 
under the Capital Requirements Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 (CRR), there is a 
strong incentive for a skewed asset allocation considering that EU sovereign debt exposures are 
allowed to be zero-risk weighted, regardless of their inherent risk, and are not subject to the 
large exposures limit of 25% of Tier 1 capital. As a consequence, potential adverse shocks 
might leave the banks in a vulnerable position. For instance, banks might find themselves 
undercapitalized as adequate capital buffers are not held to ensure that an additional layer of 
capital is available to be drawdown when losses on their portfolios are incurred. Therefore, 
banks are encouraged by the prevailing regulatory framework to hold sovereign debt issued by 
any EU Member State, since preference towards it facilitates the compliance with the capital 
requirements. In addition, with respect to the liquidity standards, no limits or haircuts are 
applied to domestic sovereign exposures that are eligible as high-quality liquid assets. Despite 
the general consensus that the high concentration of sovereign exposures poses risks for banks 
(European Parliament, 2019), close to zero progress has been made with respect to prudential 
treatment. One of the reasons includes the scarcity of sovereign default events that, if fully 
covered from a prudential point of view, could entail extremely high capital requirements and 
negatively impact banks’ balance sheets and the sovereign debt market (Enria et al., 2016).  
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The recent outbreak of COVID-19 exposed the tightening of the sovereign-bank nexus. 
Banks increased their home country sovereign debt exposures, and in addition, debt from the 
GIIPS became more appealing. Concurrently, governments were implementing fiscal programs 
and the issuance of debt securities increased. Rating agencies, shortly after, started taking action 
on banks and sovereigns considering the rising credit risks (Reuters, 2020). Nonetheless, a 
preliminary assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on the EU banking sector, published by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), indicates that banks entered this crisis in a stronger 
position in comparison to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-2009 (EBA, 2020a). Furthermore, 
according to (Enria, 2020) the stronger levels of capital and liquidity allowed banks to not 
deepen and spread the shock. In comparison to the previous crisis, there was also a faster 
reaction and banks continued to lend to costumers.  
Considering the aim of the Banking Union to break the sovereign-bank vicious circle 
(European Commission, 2012), this Work Project will assess whether the nexus between 
sovereigns and banks has been in fact weakened. The main findings are the following. Focusing 
on a sample of 11 countries between 2014 and 2020, empirical evidence supporting the increase 
in domestic sovereign debt holdings as a response to decreasing profitability and increasing 
sovereign bond spreads is presented. It is also shown that banks’ solvency was connected to 
their home country sovereign bond spreads. Lastly, including a sample of 40 banks, it is 
confirmed that the link between sovereigns’ and banks’ credit risk was still in place during the 
2017-2020 period. 
This Work Project is organized as follows. In section 2, an overview of the literature is 
presented and this work is placed in the context of the relevant work. Section 3 introduces the 
empirical methodology, addresses the data sources and reveals the empirical findings followed 
by the discussion of the results. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.  
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2 Literature review 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) identify three interacting channels responsible for the link 
between banks and sovereigns. Direct links from sovereigns to banks include the excessive 
sovereign debt exposures and, from banks to sovereigns, the government guarantees and 
potential backstops (safety nets). An indirect link arises from the domestic economy. Acharya 
et al. (2013) find empirical evidence that supports the feedback loop using credit default swaps 
(CDS) spreads for the period 2007-2011 even after controlling for aggregate and bank-level 
determinants of credit spreads. More evidence of risk transferring from the financial sector to 
the sovereign led by bailouts is presented by Stanga (2011), who estimates a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) with sign restrictions over the period of 2007 to 2011, finding 
evidence of the interlinkage between banking and government risks. Alter and Schüler (2012) 
employ a cross-country analysis for the periods before and during/after government bailouts 
employing a bivariate vector error correction (VEC) and VAR framework. In addition, they 
conduct tests on Granger-causality, use impulse responses to access the interconnections of the 
CDS spreads series and present more evidence on the private-to-public risk transfer effect. Alter 
and Beyer (2013) identity and quantify spillover effects using a VAR with exogenous variables 
(VARX) and generalized impulse response functions (IRF) to determine spillover indices. 
Based on that econometric framework they find an increasing interdependence between banks 
and sovereigns from 2009 to 2012. 
In particular, the sizable expansion of banks’ sovereign exposures was at the core of the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010-2012 and, especially, the bias towards domestic debt. Acharya 
and Steffen (2014) find evidence for an increase in the home bias of GIIPS banks between 2007 
and 2013. The incentives have been extensively debated in the literature. The skewness towards 
domestic sovereign debt has been mainly explained by “moral suasion”, the pressure of 
governments on banks to hold a greater amount of sovereign bonds when under strain, specially 
 
 6 
via direct government ownership and government influence. Becker and Ivashina (2018) 
present results for the 2007-2013 period consistent with sovereign governments inducing banks 
to take on sovereign debt, while showing a contraction on corporate loan supply during periods 
that are prone to be associated with financial repression. Ongena et al. (2019) find evidence for 
a higher increase of sovereign debt holdings on domestic banks from fiscally distressed 
countries when the government had larger refinancing necessities. An additional explanation 
attributed to the increase in sovereign home bias is the “risk-shifting” hypothesis. According to 
Andreeva and Vlassopoulos (2016), for higher sovereign CDS spreads, banks whose 
creditworthiness is positively correlated with that of the domestic sovereign, exhibit larger 
exposures to their governments’ bonds. These findings support the risk-shifting hypothesis, 
where the risk is mainly borne by the creditors whilst shareholders get the high risk premium 
at the expense of precautionary measures that would strengthen the capital buffers. Moreover, 
Acharya and Steffen (2014) argue that banks with higher short-term leverage levels, as well as 
undercapitalized banks and with more risk-weighted assets, are more prone to use low risk-
weight GIIPS government bonds as a source of high risk premia with short-term unsecured 
funding to earn the carry spread, whilst complying with the regulatory capital requirements. 
Precisely due to the low bank capital, undercapitalized banks act as buyers of last resort for the 
domestic sovereign, since in case of default banks are protected by limited liability and in good 
states home sovereign debt provides a high payoff (Crosignani, 2020). 
This Work Project is primarily related to the literature on the link between sovereign risk 
and bank risk, and banks’ biased sovereign debt purchases towards domestic sovereign debt. 
The first part of this analysis is associated with the research on the risk-shifting theory 
(Crosignani, 2020; Acharya and Steffen, 2014; Horváth et al., 2015), analyzing whether riskier 
and more vulnerable banks have stronger incentives to shift their asset allocation into riskier 
government debt. This theory is checked, particularly focusing on the home bias, by creating 
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two subsamples, GIIPS banks versus non-GIIPS banks, and the engagement on “carry trades” 
(Acharya and Steffen, 2014) is also taken into account.  
This analysis also relates to the literature on regulatory and accounting treatment of 
sovereign exposures (Enria et al., 2016). In particular, the relationship between domestic banks’ 
capital position and the changes in the sovereign bond yields was investigated. The effect of 
the home bias on the capital position of domestic banks, considering that increases in sovereign 
risk might affect banks through their holdings of domestic debt, was also assessed. These were 
checked by analyzing the link between banks’ capital and the changes in the sovereign bond 
yield spreads. This analysis is in line with the argument that excessive concentration of 
domestic debt leaves banks in a vulnerable position during periods of stress as well as with the 
discussions regarding the prudential framework with respect to sovereign exposures (BCBS, 
2017; ESRB, 2015). 
The last part of the Work Project is directly connected to the literature that use CDS spreads 
as a measure of sovereign and bank risk in order to assess the risk transfer between banks and 
sovereigns (Acharya et al., 2013; Alter and Beyer, 2013; Alter and Schüler, 2012). In the 
context of the substantial amount of existing literature addressing the interconnection and risk 
contagion between banks and sovereigns during the period of the sovereign debt crisis, this 
analysis aims to extend the timespan of the previous investigations. The econometric 
methodology followed is based on the two-step estimation technique proposed by Engle and 
Granger (1987) which also concerns the possibility of cointegration, therefore not neglecting 
useful information such as the long-run relationship between series.  
In order to assess whether the European Banking Union has weakened the sovereign-bank 
nexus, it is important to visualize the building steps towards this project and the current stance. 




3 Empirical Analysis 
This section investigates whether: 1) the profitability and solvency position of the 
European banking sector as well as home country sovereign bond yield spreads play a role on 
the changes of domestic sovereign debt holdings; 2) there is a link between sovereign risk and 
banks’ solvency, and 3) there still is a feedback loop between the credit risk of sovereigns and 
the banking system. 
The empirical analysis is divided in the aforementioned three parts and includes a sample 
of 11 countries with a particular focus on two subsamples: the peripheral countries – Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) – and, in opposition, six additional countries – 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands along with Finland (non-GIIPS). Due 
to the data constraints, both the first and second part of the analysis only include the period 
starting at the end of 2014. In contrast, the last part benefits from the data availability which 
allowed for the exploitation of three different periods between 2009 and 2020.  
3.1 Main risks and vulnerabilities of the EU banking sector  
The first section, in view of the risk-shifting theory, analyses whether riskier and more 
vulnerable banks prefer riskier government debt. According to this argument, by shifting their 
asset allocation to high-risk assets and linking their risk to the sovereign risk, banks bet on their 
own survival considering the limited liability in case of default and the otherwise potential 
benefits for shareholders (Crosignani, 2020; Acharya and Steffen, 2014). This theory cannot 
fully explain the preference towards domestic sovereign exposures since riskier and more 
vulnerable banks should also shift their sovereign allocation towards assets from other riskier 
countries. Nonetheless, the following investigation is focused on the risk-shifting behavior with 
respect to the home bias, in order to assess whether the prominent preference towards domestic 
government exposures from riskier banks located in crisis countries was still material after the 
sovereign debt crisis and the developments regarding the Banking Union. In combination, the 
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possibility of engagement in “carry trades” through the purchase of high yield sovereign bonds 
financed by short-term debt is also taken into account (Acharya and Steffen, 2014). The two 
subsamples distinguish the banks from the GIIPS, perceived as the potential weak banks 
situated in crisis countries, from non-GIIPS banks.  
3.1.1 Data 
A dataset was constructed from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020, totaling 23 quarterly observations 
(i.e., T = 23) for 11 countries. The data collection process relied on three sources: (1) the 
supervisory and prudential statistics available on the Statistical Data Warehouse; (2) the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) dataset that tracks the global demand for advanced 
economy sovereign debt and, (3) Refinitiv Eikon. Mainly due to data availability the data were 
considered on an aggregated basis. With respect to the sovereign debt exposures, it was possible 
to collect for the domestic banks the domestic debt holdings as well as the proportion of 
domestic debt, which covers both loans and securities, out of the total debt held, which covers 
currency and deposits, loans and securities (Arslanalp and Tsud, 2012). Considering that banks 
do not exclusively have exposures to governments through securities and since the analysis also 
included loans, it allowed to not underestimate the true level of sovereign debt exposures. 
Additionally, spreads of each sovereign 10-year bond yield over the German 10-year bond yield 
were used. The maturity-matched German bond yield is used as a proxy for the risk-free yield 
considering the size of the German bond market in Europe and the consequent limited liquidity 
premium. The advantage of using a spread is that it isolates the risk relative to the usual higher 
quality German yield. The dataset was perfectly balanced  
Tables A1 and A2 present summary statistics on the two bank risk indicators – common 
equity tier 1 ratio (CET1 ratio) and return-on-equity (ROE) - as well as on sovereign bond yield 
spreads and sovereign debt exposures. During the period ranging from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020, 
non-GIIPS banks had the highest averages of CET1 ratio and ROE. Additionally, on average, 
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the domestic government debt corresponds to 18.4% (16.5%) of total government debt held by 
non-GIIPS (GIIPS) banks. With respect to the average of sovereign debt holdings, the figures 
for both groups of countries are not far apart from each other.  
Figures A3.1 and A4.1 show that between Q4 2014 and Q2 2020, GIIPS and non-GIIPS 
banks have kept their levels of sovereign debt holdings fairly stable with the exception of 
German banks that showed a prominent negative trend. However, it is also noticeable that all 
countries included in the sample have increased their sovereign debt holdings during 2020, 
suggesting this action as a response to the impact of COVID-19. With respect to the GIIPS, it 
is also observable that Italian and Spanish banks show the highest levels, whilst for the non-
GIIPS, German banks hold the greatest amount. Moreover, it is clear from Figures A3.2 and 
A4.2 that an increase during 2020 occurred in several domestic sectors when it comes to the 
share of domestic debt in the total debt held, in particular for the GIIPS and France.  
A further analysis of the sovereign bond yield spreads is presented in the next subsection.  
3.1.2 Methodology 
In this section, the effect of the solvency position and profitability of the banking sector as 
well as the influence of the sovereign bond yield spreads on the home bias were investigated. 
Those connections were exploited by regressing both the home bias measure and the domestic 
sovereign debt holdings on two risk indicators – CET1 ratio and ROE - as well as on the 
domestic sovereign bond yield spreads. The home bias indicator corresponded to the proportion 
of domestic government debt in the total government debt held, which reflects the domestic 
banks’ preference towards domestic debt over foreign debt.  
Considering the structure of the dataset, a panel data regression that includes country fixed 
effects was implemented in order to control for the discrepancies across the 11 countries, i.e. 
the individual heterogeneity within the sample. Accordingly, the estimates could not be biased 
as a consequence of omitted time-invariant variables. In addition, other sources of endogeneity 
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might have risen due to simultaneity. For instances, sovereign debt exposures could be expected 
to increase bank profitability. Nonetheless, the tests of endogeneity overruled that suspicion. 
Moreover, considering that the panel unit root tests confirmed that the series were difference-
stationary, the data were first-differenced. In order to overcome cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, clustered standard errors within countries were used 
in the estimation. Two lags of each variable were included. 
Accordingly, regressions of the following form were estimated:  
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where ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐻𝑐,𝑡  ) represents the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of domestic sovereign 
debt holdings for the domestic banks of country c at time t and ∆𝐻𝐵𝑐,𝑡 is the quarterly change 
in the share of domestic government debt out of total government debt held by the domestic 
banks of country c at time t. Additionally, ∆𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐,𝑡 and ∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑐,𝑡 are the quarterly changes 
in the common equity tier 1 ratio and in return-on-equity, respectively, aggregated for the 
banking sector of country c at time t and, ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐,𝑡, the quarterly changes in the spread of the 
10-year sovereign bond yield for country c at time t over the German 10-year bond yield. Lastly, 
𝑢𝑐 and 𝑐,𝑡 are the country-specific fixed effects and the error term, respectively. Table 1 







Table 1: Relationship between the main risks and vulnerabilities of the EU banking sector 
and the domestic sovereign debt holdings 
            
 ∆ Home Bias (%)  ∆ log(Holdings)       
 GIIPS Non-GIIPS  GIIPS Non-GIIPS 
                  
∆ CET1 ratio (%)      
L0 0.1295 -0.1340 0.0191 -0.0048 
L1 0.0644 -0.2001 
 
0.0089 -0.0172 ** 
L2 0.0240 0.1606 
 
-0.0029 0.0097 
      
∆ ROE (%)      
L0 -0.0675 0.0170 -0.0078 * -0.0016 
L1 -0.0628 * 0.0296 * 
 
-0.0054 *** -0.0001 
L2 -0.0258 ** 0.0140 
 
-0.0031 ** 0.0007 
      
∆ Spread      
L0 0.1286 0.7389  0.0102 * 0.0478  
L1 0.1257 ** 0.0119  0.0165 *** 0.0641 * 
L2 -0.1288 0.0496  -0.0119 0.0344       
R-squared 14.75% 15.91%  22.25% 28.98% 
 
              
3.1.3 Discussion of the results 
The results suggest that, on average, during the Q4 2014 to Q2 2020 period, GIIPS banks 
responded to increases in their sovereign bond yield spreads and decreases in the ROE with 
increases in the proportion of domestic government debt out of total government debt held. The 
results for the domestic sovereign debt holdings are in agreement and even more prominent. 
During the same period, non-GIIPS banks with past decreases in the CET1 ratio increased their 
domestic sovereign debt holdings. The coefficient relative to past variations of the sovereign 
bond yield spreads was also statistically significant and positive. Nonetheless, the results for 
the non-GIIPS were not as consistent.  
Overall, these findings indicate that the response to changes in banks’ risks and domestic 
sovereign bond yield spread variations is not equal for both groups of countries. In particular, 
the results relative to the GIIPS support the view that riskier banks might show excess risk 
taking and seek for the high-yield debt, increasing even further the concentration of home 
country sovereign debt. Moreover, the GIIPS findings are also in line with the “carry trade” 
hypothesis (Acharya and Steffen, 2014). However, Crosignani (2020) and Acharya and Steffen 
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(2014) find that undercapitalized banks tend to hold more domestic sovereign bonds and are 
more likely to invest in carry trades, respectively, whereas in this case, decreases in profitability 
are the main incentive for riskier banks. This shift from the levels of capital to the levels of 
profitability is particularly relevant considering that European banks are facing significant 
profitability challenges whilst presenting solid capital positions (EBA 2020b), which was not 
the case in the earlier periods of the mentioned studies. As regards the COVID-19 crisis, the 
persistence of a skewed asset allocation or even the intensification of the home bias, might 
translate into the reemergence of the sovereign-bank feedback loop, in particular, in the 
countries where the exposure levels are already elevated. In a scenario of sovereign distress, 
the widening spreads could cause losses and impact banks’ capital adequacy. The recent 
increase in sovereign debt holdings might be a consequence of the absorbing role of banks, as 
they tend to take up a significant share of the government debt issued, as well as a result of the 
liquidity management. The expected prolonged low interest rate environment as well as the 
lower economic activity might pose a strain on banks in terms of profitability and solvency. 
Further challenges to banks’ profitability are expected to be presented with the asset quality 
deterioration and credit losses. 
3.2 Sovereign debt securities spreads and banks’ solvency  
The second part of the analysis examined the relationship between domestic banks’ capital 
position and the changes in the sovereign bond yields. Widening spreads have an impact on 
banks’ stability through different channels. Besides the impact on profitability and the damage 
on banks’ balance sheets, adverse market valuations penalize the value of the collateral used 
for funding and increase the funding costs (BIS, 2011). In addition, banks and sovereigns are 
also ultimately linked through indirect channels, such as the domestic economy (Dell’Ariccia 
et al., 2018). 
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With respect to the direct impact through the domestic sovereign bond holdings, the extent 
of the effect is dependent on banks’ accounting strategies, namely, if sovereign exposures are 
carried on the balance sheet at fair value (fair value through other comprehensive income and 
fair value through profit or loss) or at amortized cost. In the latter, interest revenue still appears 
on the income statement, but variations in the market value do not have any effect. Losses are, 
nonetheless, recorded in the case of impairments. Moreover, since movements in market prices 
are not reflected in the banks’ balance sheet and taken into account for capital adequacy 
purposes, regulatory capital is not set aside to absorb losses.  
Figure A5 illustrates the valuation methods used for sovereign exposures according to the 
EBA Spring 2020 Transparency Exercise (EBA, 2020c). A significant part of the exposures is 
classified at amortized cost, being that the prominent classification among most of the countries 
in the sample. Only Greece and Ireland present less than 50% of their domestic sovereign 
exposures at amortized cost. In the context of the sovereign debt crisis, a temporary sovereign 
capital buffer designed to reflect the current market valuations of sovereign exposures was 
introduced (EBA, 2011). Nonetheless, this was a temporary requirement and, currently, the 
sovereign risk is not part of the regulatory framework. As a response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, prudential filters for sovereign debt securities held at fair value through other 
comprehensive income were temporarily reintroduced (European Council, 2020), which 
diminishes the impact of market valuations on capital ratios.  
3.2.1 Data 
The analysis is based on a dataset comprising the 11 countries, which includes the tier 1 
ratio and additional indicators for the domestic banks of each country, as well as the spread of 
each 10-year sovereign bond yield over the German 10-year bond yield. The tier 1 ratio and the 
additional indicators were collected from the Statistical Data Warehouse, whilst the sovereign 
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bond yields were retrieved from Refinitiv Eikon. The dataset was created for the period from 
Q4 2014 to Q2 2020, totaling 23 quarterly observations (i.e., T = 23). 
Tables A4 and A5 present summary statistics on the balanced panel data. Between Q4 
2014 to Q2 2020, the GIIPS showed the highest average of sovereign spreads whilst non-GIIPS 
had the greatest average of tier 1 ratios, reaching 16.4% (versus 14.5%) and confirming that, 
on average, banks from non-GIIPS countries were better capitalized. 
Figures A6 and A7 show the evolution of the average tier 1 ratio and the sovereign yield 
spread for each country between Q4 2014 and Q2 2020. As regards the aggregated tier 1 ratio, 
Spanish banks showed the lowest average of 12.97%. For the last data point included in the 
sample, Spanish banks registered once again the smallest value (13.90%). Regarding the bond 
yield spreads, despite the significant decrease, Greece displays the highest spread over the 
German bond yield consistently throughout this period, being the only exception relative to 
Italy as of Q2 2020. With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the bond yield spread 
increased for every country included in the sample, being the highest increase of 65.8 bps posted 
by Portugal and followed by Spain (48.3 bps), Greece (45.6 bps) and Italy (37.7 bps). 
3.2.2 Methodology 
Considering the different contexts that might lead to changes in sovereign bond yield 
spreads, the potential impact on banks’ solvency might stem from different sources. The 
analysis started with the confirmation of the link between banks’ solvency and changes in 
sovereign bond yield spreads. Some of the potential channels were subsequentially addressed.  
Starting with the first part of the analysis, the tests for panel unit roots suggested that both 
series, of tier 1 ratios and sovereign bond yield spreads were difference-stationary. For that 
reason, the variables included consisted of first differences. Despite the low frequency data and 
the reduced historical availability, the analysis benefited from a strongly balanced dataset. 
Another empirical concern was endogeneity, considering the possible two-way relationship 
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between banks’ tier 1 capital ratio and sovereign bond yield spreads. In order to address this 
concern, a panel vector autoregression (VAR) model was used. By using the panel VAR 
methodology all variables are treated as endogenous and, simultaneously, the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity between countries is allowed (Love and Zicchino, 2006). Thus, it was 
possible to examine the relationship between the tier 1 ratios and the sovereign bond yield 
spreads while allowing for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Another important step 
when constructing a VAR model is the choice of the appropriate lag length. Based on the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Hannan 
and Quinn information criterion, one lag was chosen.  
Accordingly, the analysis relied on the following estimation: 
Yc,t= Yc,t-1A1+ uc+ ec,t (3) 
where 𝐘c,t is a (1×2) vector of the dependent variables - ∆𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐,𝑡, the quarterly changes 
in the aggregated tier 1 ratio for country c at time t, and ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐,𝑡, the quarterly changes in 
the spread of the 10-year bond yield for country c at time t over the German 10-year bond yield. 
Additionally, uc and ec,t are (1×2) vectors of dependent variable-specific panel fixed effects and 
idiosyncratic errors, respectively. Finally, 𝐀1 is a (2×2) matrix with the parameters to be 
estimated. Table 2 presents the results. Table A6 provides additional information. 
Table 2:  Relationship between the tier 1 ratio and sovereign spreads 
  GIIPS Non-GIIIPS 
∆ Tier 1 ratio (%)   
∆ Spread   
L1 -0.2185 *** -0.6138 ** 
    
∆ Spread   
∆ Tier 1 ratio   
L1 -0.2502 ** 0.0135 * 
   
Hansen’s J statistic 3.15E-33 8.35E-32 
   
In the second part, the potential channels that might have an impact on banks’ solvency 
and, in particular, if the effect through the domestic sovereign bond holdings is significant upon 
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changes in sovereign bond yield spreads are analyzed. The choice of the variables was based 
on the fact that variations in the sovereign bond yield spreads might not only lead to portfolio 
gains or losses but are also often associated with increases and decreases in credit risk and have 
an impact on funding costs. A weighted average of CDS spreads for each country was used as 
a proxy for banks’ funding costs (further details are provided in the next section). 
The tests for panel unit roots suggested that the data were difference-stationary and 
therefore, the series were first-differenced. Considering the heterogeneity in the different 
banking sectors and the exposure to fluctuations in macroeconomic fundamentals, panel data 
regressions that include country fixed effects were used. In order to control for cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, clustered standard errors within countries were used 
in the estimations. 
Firstly, the following OLS regressions were estimated: 
∆𝑦𝑐,𝑡  =  𝛽𝑖∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐,𝑡  + 𝑢𝑐 +  𝑐,𝑡 (4) 
where ∆𝑦𝑐,𝑡 represents the quarterly change in one of the following variables for the domestic 
banks of country c at time t: RWA ratio, the risk-weighted assets over total assets; Provisions 
ratio, the provisions over total assets; FV ratio, the gains and losses on financial assets and 
liabilities at fair value through profit and loss over total assets; Trading ratio, the gains and 
losses on financial assets held for trading and liabilities over total assets, and; log(CDS), the 
natural logarithm of the weighted average of banks’ CDS spreads, aggregated for the banking 
sector of country c at time t. Lastly, 𝑢𝑐 and 𝑐,𝑡 are the country-specific fixed effects and the 
error term, respectively. Table A7 reports the results. 
Additionally, the following panel regression was estimated: 
∆𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝑅𝑊𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐,𝑡  +  𝛽2∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐶𝐷𝑆)𝑐,𝑡 + 
                                  + 𝛽4∆𝐹𝑉 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐,𝑡 +  𝑢𝑐 + 𝑐,𝑡 
(5) 
Table A8 presents the results. 
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3.2.3 Discussion of the results 
As reported in Table 2, for both groups of countries, evidence of the connectedness 
between sovereign spread movements and changes in the domestic banks’ tier 1 ratio was 
found. Furthermore, the ∆Spread coefficient for the non-GIIPS countries was in absolute terms 
almost three times greater than the one for the GIIPS. On average, during the period spanning 
from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020, a 100 basis points increase in the Spread translated into a 0.61 
percentage points decrease in the non-GIIPS banks’ Tier 1 ratio. By performing the Granger 
causality test, it was confirmed that past values of the sovereign bond yield spreads were useful 
to predict the values of the tier 1 ratio, conditional on past values of the tier 1 ratio (Table A9). 
Additionally, with respect to the GIIPS, the results also suggest that concerns about the 
solvency of the banks might lead to higher spreads of the home country sovereign bonds. The 
impulse–response functions (IRFs) were also calculated. Considering that first differences were 
used, cumulative IRFs were computed. Figure 1 illustrates the Tier 1 ratio response to a spread 
shock and Table A10 presents the results. The IRFs suggest that the Tier 1 ratio from the GIIPS 
suffers a more prominent impact after a shock in Spread. 
Figure 1: Impulse response functions 







The second part of the analysis indicates that, for both groups of countries, on average, the 
increases in ∆Spread had a positive statistically significant impact on ∆FV ratio during the 
period between Q4 2014 and Q2 2020. However, with respect to the ∆Tier 1 ratio, the 
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coefficients on the ∆FV ratio were not statistically significant. The same was found with respect 
to the ∆Trading ratio in the case of non-GIIPS countries. Additionally, the results suggest that 
both the GIIPS and non-GIIPS banks’ funding costs are impacted by the changes in risk premia 
and that, in turn, banks’ solvency is also slightly affected. 
Overall, from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020, domestic banks’ solvency and sovereign bond spreads 
were connected, which is in agreement with the multidimensional channels responsible for the 
two-way feedback between banks and sovereigns discussed by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018). 
Nonetheless, it was also noticeable that banks’ vulnerability to higher concentrations of 
sovereign debt securities has been limited. One of the explanations stems from the accounting 
treatment of the sovereign exposures, considering that a large share is subject to amortized cost 
accounting (e.g. ECB, 2020; IMF, 2020).  
3.3 The Sovereign-Bank Feedback Loop 
To end the analysis, the direction and magnitude of the risk transmission between the 
banking sector and sovereigns was assessed. The core of the methodology relied on a bivariate 
panel VECM, allowing for endogeneity while capturing the causal relationship between two 
sets of variables over time. With respect to the bank and sovereign risk indicators, CDS spreads 
were used since these are a common measure of bank and sovereign risk among the relevant 
literature. Moreover, not only CDSs are actively traded and therefore, highly liquid but also, 
considering the sample period, are reasonably available.  
3.3.1 Data 
As aforementioned, CDS spreads were the proxy used to measure the sovereign risk of the 
11 countries, as well as the bank risk for a sample of 40 banks established in the same 11 
countries. In particular, 5-year senior unsecured CDS quotes retrieved from Bloomberg 
(Stanga, 2011; Alter and Schüler, 2012; Alter and Beyer, 2013). With respect to the bank risk, 
the sample of 40 banks was selected based on the EBA Spring 2020 transparency exercise, an 
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approach inspired by the one used by Acharya and Steffen (2014). Table A11 shows the list of 
the banks included in the sample. Only the banks that did not have 5-year senior unsecured 
CDS quotes available throughout the whole duration were dropped. A weighted average was 
computed for each country with the weights based on the banks’ total assets as of end-2019. 
The analysis was narrowed to three periods. The first period spanned from the beginning of 
2009 to the end of 2012, covering the peak of the sovereign debt crisis. The second started 
immediately after and lasted until 2016, addressing the awakening from the crisis and the efforts 
to make the financial system more stable and resilient. The last one began in 2017 and lasted 
until the third quarter of 2020, including the impact of all the reforms implemented after the 
financial crisis and subsequent amendments, but also the primary shock of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Weekly data were used (Stanga, 2011). 
Tables A12 and A13 present summary statistics on sovereign CDS and bank CDS for 
GIIPS and non-GIIPS, respectively, for the three periods considered. It is noticeable that for 
both groups, the average sovereign CDS spread as well as the average bank CDS spread have 
substantially decreased throughout these periods. Additionally, and as expected, both averages 
are consistently higher for the GIIPS. 
Figures A9.1 and A9.2 and Figures A10.1 and A10.2 display the movement of weekly 
sovereign CDS and weekly weighted average bank CDS for GIIPS and non-GIIPS, 
respectively, during 2020. Regarding the banking sector, the highest impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic was felt by the Portuguese and Italian banks. Whereas for sovereigns, the highest 
impact was noted in Greece and Italy. Even though the shock was also noticeable for the non-
GIIPS, the overall effect was less pronounced. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
The panel unit root diagnostics confirmed that both series were difference-stationary. 
However, if the variables were cointegrated, not taking into account cointegration would lead 
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to a misspecified model. Considering the relation between bank and sovereign CDSs and its 
dynamic link, it was also important to account for endogeneity. Accordingly, a similar approach 
to the two-step estimation technique proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) was adopted.  
Firstly, the following model was estimated in order to obtain the residuals: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐 + 𝑐,𝑡 (6) 
where 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐,𝑡 is the weekly weighted average of the bank CDS spreads of country c at 
time t and  𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐,𝑡 is the weekly sovereign CDS spread of country c at time t. 
Additionally, uc and εc,t are the country fixed effects and the idiosyncratic error term, 
respectively. The standard errors were clustered at the country-level to allow for correlation of 
errors terms within countries. 
The residuals were obtained, and it was assumed that the lagged form contains information 
about the long-term relationship between bank CDS spreads and sovereign CDS spreads. These 
lagged residuals were defined as the error correction term (ECT) and included in the estimation 
of a panel VECM with the first differences of both variables, Bank CDS and Sovereign CDS. 
The lag length was set to two based on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion. 
Specifically, the following model was estimated: 
𝐘c,t  =  ∑ 𝐘𝐜,𝐭−𝐢𝐀𝐢
2
i=1
+  𝐇c𝐄𝐂𝐓𝐜,𝐭−𝟏 +  𝐮c +  𝐞c,t 
(7) 
where 𝐘c,t is a (1×2) vector of the dependent variables, ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐,𝑡), aggregated for 
country c at time t, and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑐,𝑡), for country c at time t. 𝐄𝐂𝐓𝐜,𝐭−𝟏 is a (1×2) 
vector of the residuals obtained from the previous regression. Additionally, uc and ec,t are (1×2) 
vectors of dependent variable-specific panel fixed effects and idiosyncratic errors, respectively. 
Finally, 𝐀i and 𝐇c are (2×2) matrices with the parameters to be estimated.  
The estimation was repeated for the three periods and for both groups of countries. Table 
3 presents the results. Table A14 provides complementary information. 
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Table 3: The Sovereign-Bank Feedback Loop 
 GIIPS Non-GIIIPS 
 2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 
              
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS)             
∆ Log(Bank CDS)       
L1  -0.2528 *** -0.0134 -0.0190 -0.1188 *** 0.1641 *** 0.1072 * 
L2  -0.0216 0.0638 * 0.0080 0.1199 *** 0.0432 *** 0.0603 ** 
       
∆ Log(Bank CDS)             
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) 
L1  0.1243 *** 0.0321 0.1146 * 0.0835 *** 0.0010 -0.0246 
L2  0.0731 * -0.0505 0.1207 *** -0.0103 -0.0039 0.1249 *** 
Hansen’s J statistic 1.08E-31 9.42E-32 9.19E-32 3.63E-31 2.56E-31 6.55E-32 
 
3.3.3 Discussion of the results 
As expected, evidence of the sovereign-bank feedback loop during the first period, in fact, 
for both groups of countries, was found. With respect to the second period, between 2013 and 
2016, more evidence of the feedback loop in the non-GIIPS countries, which is not similarly 
observed in the GIIPS, is presented. Finally, over the last period, which spanned from 2017 to 
Q3 2020, the results suggest that the link was still in place. More specifically, for both groups 
of countries, on average, a past 10% increase in the Sovereign CDS spread leads to an 
approximate 1.2% increase in the Bank CDS spread.  
From a Granger causality perspective, the tests revealed that past values of the Bank CDS 
spreads were useful to predict the values of the Sovereign CDS spreads, conditional on past 
values of the Sovereign CDS spreads, for both groups of countries during the first two periods. 
With respect to the reverse causal relationship, the null hypothesis that Sovereign CDS spreads 
do not Granger-cause Bank CDS spreads was rejected at the 1% confidence level in all periods 
for the GIIPS. Regarding the non-GIIPS, the same null hypotheses was not rejected only 
between 2013 and 2016. Table A15 provides the results. The cumulative IRFs were also 
estimated and are presented on Figure A11 as well as in Table A16. Figure 2 shows that in the 
most recent period, the Bank CDS spreads from the GIIPS observed the biggest impact after a 
shock in Sovereign CDS spreads and it is also the impact that lasted the longest.  
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions 






Previous studies regarding the sovereign-bank loop are generally focused on the sovereign 
debt crisis period and are all in agreement on the existence of some type of connection between 
sovereigns and banks during that period (Stanga, 2011; Alter and Schuler, 2012; Alter and 
Beyer, 2013; Acharya et al., 2013). This work is in line with prior research and with more recent 
studies that find that the doom loop weakened around the time of the introduction of the 
Banking Union (Covi and Eydam, 2020). Nonetheless, the results suggest that the 
connectedness between the credit risk of sovereigns and the banking sector is still present and 
in both groups of countries. This interdependence might pose a stronger threat with the negative 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the fiscal measures to support the economies 
and the rising sovereign debt holdings pose a concern as banks take up a notorious stake of the 
government debt issued. Not only that, but also indirect effects such as banks’ exposure to the 
domestic economy might intensify the linkage. 
4 Conclusion 
Considering that banks and sovereigns are prominently intertwined, the vulnerabilities in 
one sector intensify the transmission of the tension to the other sector, creating an adverse 
feedback loop. In the past, the linkage between both has given rise to pressure regarding the 
financial system’s stability.  
In light of banks’ tendency to keep large concentrations of their home country sovereign 
debt on their balance sheets, this work investigated how banks responded, in more recent years, 
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to capital and profitability deteriorations as well as to increases in sovereign bond yield spreads. 
This biased allocation was particularly heightened during the sovereign debt crisis and very 
debated in combination with the following topics: moral suasion, moral hazard and risk-
shifting, and the engagement in carry trades. The results suggest that, on average, during the 
Q4 2014 to Q2 2020 period, GIIPS banks responded to increases in their home country 
sovereign bond yield spreads and decreases in profitability with increases in the domestic 
sovereign debt holdings. These findings support the view that less profitable banks might show 
excess risk taking and seek for high-yield debt, increasing even further the concentration of 
home country sovereign debt. That riskier behavior is not disincentivized by the prudential 
regulation that still does not address the home bias issue in order to reduce the exposure to 
sovereign risk. For instance, regardless of the risk, zero risk-weights are still assigned to EU 
sovereign bonds and no large exposure limits are imposed.  
Secondly, it is also shown that during the same period, banks’ solvency was connected to 
their home country sovereign bond yield spreads. However, it was also noticeable that banks’ 
vulnerability to higher concentrations of sovereign debt securities has been limited. One of the 
main explanations stems from the accounting treatment of the sovereign exposures, considering 
that a large share is subject to amortized cost accounting. Moreover, considering that prudential 
filters for sovereign bond exposures were temporarily introduced as a response to the COVID-
19 pandemic, it has also become clear that diminishing the impact of the volatility of market 
valuations on capital adequacy is a major concern. Nonetheless, in turn, that could be translated 
in an encouragement to increase the exposure to high-yield sovereign debt, also considering the 
accessible central bank funding, reinforcing the sovereign-bank nexus.  
Lastly, using CDS data, it was found that a sovereign-bank linkage is still in place both in 
the GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries. In particular, it was revealed that, with respect to the 2017 
to Q3 2020 period, Granger causality is only significant in one of the directions, from the 
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sovereign to the banking sector. The analysis of the impulse response functions indicated that 
the impact of a sovereign shock has significant lingering effects on the banks’ creditworthiness, 
in particular in the GIIPS.   
Overall, the results suggest that the sovereign-bank nexus could potentially be reinforced. 
Considering the economic challenges brought by COVID-19 and the unavoidable impact on 
the European banking sector, along with the increasing sovereign exposures, the concerns about 
the nexus that have been reemerging should be addressed. In particular, the significant rise of 
sovereign indebtedness resulting from the fiscal measures aimed at supporting the economy is 
one of the channels that can potentially lead to the resurgence of the sovereign-bank nexus. 
However, a precipitated removal of the fiscal support could compromise the economic 
recovery. Nonetheless, despite the massive shock of COVID-19, both the impact on CDS and 
sovereign debt spreads remained modest when compared to the sovereign debt crisis. That 
limited effect might be a result of the improved resilience and strength of the European banking 
sector and the confidence on the European institutions commitment to contain the disruption. 
In order to diminish the risk of intertwined crisis, the efforts to provide a coordinated response 
instead of keeping it at a national level are imperative. Considering banks’ capacity to absorb 
the losses and maintain their capital adequacy, it is concluded that the Banking Union has 
passed the first significant test suddenly dictated by the outbreak of COVID-19. 
With respect to future research, this work could be extended to a broader set of countries 
and include the COVID-19 crisis period. Considering the limitations regarding data availability, 
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6.1 Context  
The call for the Banking Union materialized with the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
following sovereign debt crisis which uncovered the close link between the vulnerabilities of 
sovereigns and the weaknesses of the banking sector. Considering the interdependence between 
EU countries as well as the possibility of spillover effects and contagion, the necessity of a 
more integrated banking system became a priority. In 2012, the European Commission 
developed “A Roadmap towards a Banking Union” which advocated a more integrated 
financial framework (European Commission, 2012). The first pillar of the Banking Union - the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) - became fully operational in 2014. Since then, the ECB 
is responsible for the direct supervision of significant institutions (SIs) while the national 
competent authorities (NCAs) supervise, in close cooperation with the ECB, the less significant 
institutions (LSIs). The second pillar of the Banking Union - the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) – became fully operational in 2016. The SRM aims to guarantee an orderly resolution 
of failing banks while minimizing costs for taxpayers and to the real economy. The SRM 
ensures that bank failures are managed efficiently through a Single Resolution Board (SRB) 
and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF). In addition, the Single Rulebook provides a set of EU 
laws consistently applied across the Euro Area and in other participating countries. This 
package comprises rules on capital requirements, recovery and resolution processes and 
national deposit guarantee schemes. At the moment, although the first two pillars of the 
Banking Union are fully operational – the SSM and the SRM - a third pillar which envisages a 
common system for deposit protection is still missing owing to meaningful discrepancies 
between the Member States. In 2015, the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS) was proposed by the European Commission as the third pillar of the Banking 
Union (European Commission, 2015). The home bias is one of the blockages since some 
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countries fear that deposits protected by EDIS would be used by domestic banks, under moral 
suasion from their respective home countries, to fund the purchase of large quantities of 
government debt (Véron, 2017). The fact that deposits are not yet homogeneously protected at 
the European level leaves the Banking Union project incomplete. Not only does it remain 
unfinished but its aim of breaking the sovereign-bank nexus has not been achieved. In 
particular, the home bias problem is still supporting the prominent link between banks and 
sovereigns since banks still show a strong preference towards domestic sovereign exposures. 
Besides highlighting the necessity of strengthening the cooperation of monetary, fiscal and 
supervisory authorities, the financial crisis also revealed banks’ weak capacity to absorb losses, 
the inadequacy of the capital requirements, the poor liquidity and risk management and the 
insufficient governance (European Commission, 2013). Therefore, these issues and adequate 
supervisory thresholds became part of the agenda as well. Accordingly, the Basel III was agreed 
in 2010 in order to address the precedent shortcomings of Basel II and, two legal acts – the 
Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements 
Regulation 575/2013 (CRR) - entered into force in 2014. In 2019, CRD V and CRR II, which 
finetuned and continued to implement Basel III by making key amendments, were introduced. 
The package will be generally applied starting as of mid-2021. 
Regardless of how effective the implementation of the SSM and the SRM was, there are 
still sovereign-bank linkages in place. The ongoing discussions regarding possible solutions to 
diminish the nexus and strengthen the Banking Union include the EDIS and sovereign exposure 
concentration charges (Véron, 2017). The latter would address the home bias problem by 










Note: Figure A1 plots the general government gross debt held by domestic banks as a 
percentage of the total debt in the period from Q1 2008 to Q4 2012 for the GIIPS. The domestic 
debt covers both loans and securities and the total debt held covers currency and deposits, loans 
and securities. 
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Note: Figure A2 plots the monthly 10-year government benchmark bond yields for the GIIPS 
as well as for Germany in the period from January 2008 to December 2012. 
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Note: Figure A3.1 plots the general government gross debt held by domestic banks in the period 
from Q2 2014 to Q2 2020 for the GIIPS, in billions of euros. Figure A3.2 plots the holdings of 
general government gross debt as a percentage of the total debt held by domestic banks during 
the same period for the GIIPS. The domestic debt covers both loans and securities and the total 
debt held covers currency and deposits, loans and securities. 
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Note: Figure A4.1 plots the general government gross debt held by domestic banks in the period 
from Q2 2014 to Q2 2020 for the GIIPS, in billions of euros. Figure A4.2 plots the holdings of 
general government gross debt as a percentage of the total debt held by domestic banks during 
the same period for the non-GIIPS. The domestic debt covers both loans and securities and the 
total debt held covers currency and deposits, loans and securities. 
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Note: Figure A5 plots the percentage of direct domestic sovereign exposures, on balance sheet, 
according to the accounting classification used, for Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Austra, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. The measure used is the total 
gross carrying amount of non-derivative finantial assets (net of short positions). The sovereign 
exposures have a reference date of December 2019.  
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Financial assets at amortised cost
Financial assets at fair value through other comprehensive income
Financial assets designated at fair value through profit or loss
Financial assets held for trading
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Note: Figure A6 plots the spread of the sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 10-year 
bond yield (LHS, solid lines) and the aggregated tier 1 ratio (RHS, dot lines) for the GIIPS in 
the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020. 
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Notes: Figure A7 plots the spread of the sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 10-
year bond yield (LHS, solid lines) and the aggregated tier 1 ratio (RHS, dot lines) for the non-
GIIPS in the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020. 
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Note: Figure A8 plots the impulse reaction functions (IRF) in the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 
2020. Column (1) shows the cumulative IRF for the GIIPS and column (2) the cumulative IRF 
for the non-GIIPS countries. The IRF confidence intervals are computed using 200 Monte Carlo 
draws from the distribution of the panel VAR model with clustered errors at country level. The 
impulse variable corresponds to ∆Spread, which is the quarterly change in the spread of 
sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 10-year bond yield, and the response variable 



















Note: Figure A9.1 plots the weekly 5-year senior unsecured sovereign CDS spreads in basis 
points since the start of 2020 until the third quarter of 2020 for the GIIPS. Figure A9.2 plots the 
weekly weighted average of 5-year senior unsecured bank CDS spreads in basis points since 
the beginning of 2020 until the end of the third quarter of 2020 for the GIIPS. The selection of 
the banks was based on the Spring 2020 EBA transparency exercise. Table A11 shows the list 
of the banks included. The weighted average was computed for each country with the weights 
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Note: Figure A10.1 plots the weekly 5-year senior unsecured sovereign CDS spreads in basis 
points since the start of 2020 until the third quarter of 2020 for the non-GIIPS countries. Figure 
A10.2 plots the weekly weighted average of 5-year senior unsecured bank CDS spreads in basis 
points since the beginning of 2020 until the end of the third quarter of 2020 for the non-GIIPS 
countries. The selection of the banks was based on the Spring 2020 EBA transparency exercise. 
Table 11 shows the list of the banks included. The weighted average was computed for each 
country with the weights based on the banks’ total assets as of end-2019.    
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Figure A11: Impulse response functions 
 
Panel A: GIIPS 
2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Panel B: Non-GIIPS 
2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
Note: Figure A11 plots the impulse reaction functions (IRF). Panel 1 shows the cumulative IRF 
for the GIIPS and Panel B the cumulative IRF for the non-GIIPS countries. Columns (1) and 
(4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) present the results for three periods, 2009-2012, 2013-2016 and 
2017- Q3 2020, respectively. The IRF confidence intervals are computed using 200 Monte 
Carlo draws from the distribution of the panel VAR model with robust errors. The impulse 
variable corresponds to ∆Log(Sovereign CDS), which is the weekly logarithmic change in 
sovereign CDS and the response variable denotes ∆Log(Bank CDS), which represents the 









Table A1: Summary Statistics 
 
              
Panel A: GIIPS 
       
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
              
       
Home Bias (%) overall 16.52% 8.49% 4.76% 30.02% N =     115 
 between  9.31% 6.21% 27.74% n =       5 
 within  1.44% 12.45% 20.95% T =      23 
       
Holdings overall 199.885 246.153 15.544 687.439 N =     115 
 between  273.607 18.365 650.514 n =       5 
 within  13.324 137.713 241.176 T =      23 
       
CET1 (%) overall 13.97% 2.16% 10.67% 18.38% N =     115 
 between  2.07% 12.27% 16.73% n =       5 
 within  1.12% 10.78% 16.40% T =      23 
       
ROE (%) overall 1.20% 5.41% -24.23% 8.27% N =     115 
 between  3.64% -4.41% 4.17% n =       5 
 within  4.31% -18.62% 7.76% T =      23 
       
Spread overall 2.19 2.42 0.25 14.64 N =     115 
 between  2.07 0.53 5.78 n =       5 
 within  1.55 -1.94 11.05 T =      23 
       
              
       
∆ Home Bias (%) overall 0.12% 0.69% -2.82% 1.98% N =     110 
 between  0.12% 0.00% 0.31% n =       5 
 within  0.68% -3.01% 1.81% T =      22 
       
∆ Holdings overall 0.0003 0.0568 -0.1544 0.1441 N =     110 
 between  0.0023 -0.0018 0.0030 n =       5 
 within  0.0567 -0.1566 0.1418 T =      22 
       
∆ CET1 (%) overall 0.09% 0.69% -2.16% 2.82% N =     110 
 between  0.06% 0.04% 0.17% n =       5 
 within  0.69% -2.16% 2.88% T =      22 
       
∆ ROE (%) overall -0.07% 4.71% -21.48% 24.57% N =     110 
 between  0.42% -0.58% 0.33% n =       5 
 within  4.70% -21.88% 24.17% T =      22 
       
∆ Spread overall -0.08 0.87 -6.77 3.22 N =     110 
 between  0.15 -0.34 0.02 n =       5 
 within  0.86 -6.51 3.48 T =      22 
       
              
 
Note: This table includes summary statistics on bank indicators, government debt holdings and 
sovereign bond yield spreads, with respect to the GIIPS, in the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 
2020. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, IMF dataset that tracks the global demand for 






Table A2: Summary Statistics 
 
              
Panel A: Non-GIIPS 
       
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
              
       
Home Bias (%) overall 18.35% 4.34% 11.97% 29.15% N =     138 
 between  4.29% 14.33% 26.10% n =       6 
 within  1.85% 13.77% 22.54% T =      23 
       
Holdings overall 197.92 208.59 17.14 646.97 N =     138 
 between  225.80 19.80 560.73 n =       6 
 within  26.67 110.31 284.16 T =      23 
       
CET1 (%) overall 15.40% 1.86% 11.74% 20.28% N =     138 
 between  1.72% 13.61% 18.47% n =       6 
 within  0.99% 12.85% 17.22% T =      23 
       
ROE (%) overall 4.28% 2.91% -1.95% 12.25% N =     138 
 between  1.53% 1.50% 6.04% n =       6 
 within  2.55% -2.04% 10.48% T =      23 
       
Spread overall 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.63 N =     138 
 between  0.13 0.00 0.35 n =       6 
 within  0.07 0.04 0.50 T =      23 
       
              
       
∆ Home Bias (%) overall 0.21% 0.53% -1.40% 1.58% N =     132 
 between  0.13% -0.03% 0.33% n =       6 
 within  0.52% -1.40% 1.46% T =      22 
       
∆ Holdings overall 0.0049 0.0325 -0.1400 0.0947 N =     132 
 between  0.0108 -0.0144 0.0124 n =       6 
 within  0.0309 -0.1335 0.0890 T =      22 
       
∆ CET1 (%) overall 0.09% 0.49% -2.90% 1.50% N =     132 
 between  0.05% 0.04% 0.15% n =       6 
 within  0.49% -2.85% 1.55% T =      22 
       
∆ ROE (%) overall -0.14% 3.52% -10.40% 4.06% N =     132 
 between  0.19% -0.37% 0.14% n =       6 
 within  3.52% -10.17% 4.24% T =      22 
       
∆ Spread overall 0.00 0.10 -0.29 0.27 N =     132 
 between  0.00 0.00 0.00 n =       6 
 within  0.10 -0.29 0.27 T =      22 
       
              
 
Note: This table includes summary statistics on bank indicators, government debt holdings and 
sovereign bond yield spreads, with respect to the non-GIIPS, in the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 
2020.  
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, IMF dataset that tracks the global demand for 





Table A3: Relationship between the main risks and vulnerabilities of the EU banking sector 
and the domestic sovereign debt holdings 
 
            
 ∆ Home Bias (%)  ∆ log(Holdings)       
 GIIPS Non-GIIPS  GIIPS Non-GIIPS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
                  
∆ CET1 ratio (%)      
L0 0.1295 -0.1340 0.0191 -0.0048 
L1 0.0644 -0.2001 
 
0.0089 -0.0172 ** 
L2 0.0240 0.1606 
 
-0.0029 0.0097 
      
∆ ROE (%)      
L0 -0.0675 0.0170 -0.0078 * -0.0016 
L1 -0.0628 * 0.0296 * 
 
-0.0054 *** -0.0001 
L2 -0.0258 ** 0.0140 
 
-0.0031 ** 0.0007 
      
∆ Spread      
L0 0.1286 0.7389  0.0102 * 0.0478  
L1 0.1257 ** 0.0119  0.0165 *** 0.0641 * 
L2 -0.1288 0.0496  -0.0119 0.0344       
Observations 100 120  100 120       
Countries 5 6  5 6       
R-squared 14.75% 15.91%  22.25% 28.98%       
            
 
Note: This table shows the effect of the changes of two bank risk indicators and sovereign bond 
spread variations on the changes in the home bias measure and in the domestic sovereign debt 
holdings, in the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020. Columns (1) and (3) presents the results for 
the GIIPS domestic banks and columns (2) and (4) presents for the non-GIIPS. The first 
dependent variable, Home Bias, represents the share of domestic government debt holdings out 
of total government debt holdings for the domestic banks from each country. The second 
dependent variable, Holdings, represents the domestic government debt holdings for the 
domestic banks from each country in billions of Euros. The set of independent variables 
includes: the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (CET1), the return on equity ratio (ROE) and the 
spread of sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 10-year bond yield (Spread). L0, L1 
and L2 represent the contemporaneous value, the first lag and the second lag, respectively, of 
the explanatory variables included in the model. The regressions include country fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at country level. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, IMF dataset that tracks the global demand for 




Table A4: Summary Statistics  
 
              
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
  
      
       
Spread overall 2.19 2.42 0.25 14.64 N =     115 
 between 
 2.07 0.53 5.78 n =       5 
 within 
 1.55 -1.94 11.05 T =      23 
       
Tier1 ratio (%) overall 14.5% 2.2% 10.7% 19.3% N =     115 
 between 
 2.1% 12.9% 17.6% n =       5 
 within 
 1.3% 11.4% 17.3% T =      23 
       
RWA ratio (%) overall 53.4% 8.8% 39.5% 73.1% N =     115 
 between 
 9.2% 45.3% 66.6% n =       5 
 within 
 2.9% 45.9% 59.9% T =      23 
Provisions ratio (%) overall 0.8% 0.3% 0.3% 1.3% N =     115 
 between 
 0.2% 0.4% 1.0% n =       5 
 within 
 0.2% 0.5% 1.5% T =      23 
       
Fair Value ratio (%) overall 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% N =     115 
 between 
 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% n =       5 
 within 
 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% T =      23 
       
Trading ratio (%) overall 0.0% 0.1% -0.1% 0.1% N =     115 
 between 
 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% n =       5 
 within 
 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% T =      23 
       
CDS overall 379.49 536.89 41.18 3399.63 N =     115 
 between 
 496.64 91.68 1255.64 n =       5 
 within 
 298.66 -196.91 2523.48 T =      23 
 
      
  
      
       
∆ Spread overall -0.08 0.87 -6.77 3.22 N =     110 
 between 
 0.15 -0.34 0.02 n =       5 
 within 
 0.86 -6.51 3.48 T =      22 
       
∆ Tier1 ratio (%) overall 0.14% 0.71% -1.77% 2.77% N =     110 
 between 
 0.07% 0.04% 0.20% n =       5 
 within 
 0.70% -1.80% 2.87% T =      22 
       
∆ RWA ratio (%) overall -0.24% 1.06% -4.14% 3.35% N =     110 
 between 
 0.26% -0.44% 0.16% n =       5 
 within 
 1.04% -4.53% 2.96% T =      22 
       
∆ Provisions ratio (%) overall -0.01% 0.13% -0.88% 0.34% N =     110 
 between 
 0.01% -0.03% 0.00% n =       5 
 within 
 0.13% -0.86% 0.36% T =      22 
       
∆ Fair Value ratio (%) overall 0.00% 0.03% -0.08% 0.20% N =     110 
 between 
 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% n =       5 
 within 
 0.03% -0.09% 0.19% T =      22 
       
∆ Trading ratio (%) overall 0.00% 0.05% -0.19% 0.09% N =     110 
 between 
 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% n =       5 
 within 
 0.05% -0.19% 0.09% T =      22 
       
∆ log(CDS) overall -2.06 302.35 -1629.60 1827.57 N =     110 
 between 
 3.10 -6.12 1.19 n =       5 
 within 
 302.34 -1631.24 1825.93 T =      22 
       
              
Note: This table includes summary statistics on bank consolidated data as well as on spreads of 
sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 10-year bond yield, in the period from Q4 2014 
to Q2 2020, for the GIIPS. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon. 
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Table A5: Summary Statistics  
 
                     
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
              
       
Spread overall 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.63 N =     138 
 between  0.13 0.00 0.35 n =       6 
 within  0.07 0.04 0.50 T =      23        
Tier1 ratio (%) overall 16.41% 1.99% 12.07% 20.93% N =     138 
 between  1.85% 14.49% 19.35% n =       6 
 within  1.03% 13.27% 17.99% T =      23        
RWA ratio (%) overall 36.00% 6.55% 28.92% 50.70% N =     138 
 between  7.01% 30.21% 49.01% n =       6 
 within  1.32% 32.51% 39.50% T =      23        
Provisions ratio (%) overall 0.47% 0.36% 0.00% 1.08% N =     138 
 between  0.38% 0.07% 0.97% n =       6 
 within  0.06% 0.34% 0.61% T =      23        
Fair Value ratio (%) overall 0.01% 0.09% -0.37% 0.35% N =     138 
 between  0.01% -0.01% 0.02% n =       6 
 within  0.08% -0.35% 0.36% T =      23        
Trading ratio (%) overall 0.05% 0.09% -0.29% 0.43% N =     138 
 between  0.05% -0.01% 0.14% n =       6 
 within  0.08% -0.38% 0.34% T =      23        
CDS overall 71.97 36.19 19.48 221.39 N =     138 
 between  25.15 48.63 114.16 n =       6 
 within  27.91 12.63 179.20 T =      23 
       
              
       
∆ Spread overall 0.00 0.10 -0.29 0.27 N =     132 
 between  0.00 0.00 0.00 n =       6 
 within  0.10 -0.29 0.27 T =      22        
∆ Tier1 ratio (%) overall 0.11% 0.47% -2.07% 1.48% N =     132 
 between  0.05% 0.05% 0.18% n =       6 
 within  0.47% -2.04% 1.51% T =      22        
∆ RWA ratio (%) overall -0.09% 1.04% -4.10% 2.22% N =     132 
 between  0.14% -0.29% 0.07% n =       6 
 within  1.03% -3.89% 2.36% T =      22        
∆ Provisions ratio (%) overall 0.00% 0.04% -0.11% 0.20% N =     132 
 between  0.01% -0.01% 0.01% n =       6 
 within  0.04% -0.12% 0.19% T =      22        
∆ Fair Value ratio (%) overall 0.00% 0.10% -0.34% 0.71% N =     132 
 between  0.00% 0.00% 0.01% n =       6 
 within  0.10% -0.35% 0.71% T =      22        
∆ Trading ratio (%) overall -0.01% 0.10% -0.72% 0.29% N =     132 
 between  0.00% -0.01% 0.00% n =       6 
 within  0.10% -0.71% 0.28% T =      22        
∆ log(CDS) overall -1.32 19.04 -51.89 70.67 N =     132 
 between  1.70 -4.50 0.21 n =       6 
 within  18.98 -52.05 73.84 T =      22        
              
Note: This table includes summary statistics on bank consolidated data as well as on spreads of 
sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 10-year bond yield, in the period from Q4 2014 
to Q2 2020, for the non-GIIPS countries. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon. 
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Table A6:  Relationship between the tier 1 ratio and sovereign spreads 
 
 
 GIIPS Non-GIIIPS 
 (1) (2) 
      
∆ Tier 1 ratio     
∆ Tier 1 ratio   
L1  -0.2062 *** -0.0785 
∆ Spread   
L1  -0.2185 *** -0.6138 ** 
      
∆ Spread     
∆ Tier 1 ratio   
L1  -0.2502 ** 0.0135 * 
∆ Spread   
L1  -0.1761 *** -0.3502 *** 
         
Observations 100 120 
Countries 5 6 
Hansen’s J statistic 3.15E-33 8.35E-32 
      
   
 
Note: This table shows the results of panel autoregressions, whose dependent variables denotes 
the aggregated tier 1 ratio and the sovereign spread, in the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020.  
Column (1) presents the results for the GIIPS countries and column (2) shows the results for 
the non-GIIPS countries. ∆Tier1 is the quarterly change of the consolidated tier 1 ratio and 
∆Spread is the quarterly change in the spread of sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 
10-year bond yield. L1 represents the first lag of the dependent variables included in the model. 
Standard errors are clustered at country level. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 




Table A7:  Relationship between bank indicators and sovereign spreads 
 
 
 ∆ RWA ratio 
∆ Provisions 
ratio 
∆ Fair Value 
ratio 
∆ Trading ratio ∆ log(CDS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: GIIPS 
∆ Spread      
L0 0.0443 -0.0072 0.0076 ** -0.0010 -135.1591 ** 
L1 - - - - 187.1378 *** 
Observations 110 110 110 110 105 
Countries 5 5 5 5 5 
R-Squared 4.86% 0.01 4.96% 0.50% 56.42% 
      
Panel B: Non-GIIPS 
∆ Spread           
L0 0.6685 0.0080 0.2606 * -0.1832 * 63.1688 ** 
L1 - - - - 17.4404 
Observations 132 132 132 132 126 
Countries 6 6 6 6 6 
R-Squared 1.98% 2.75% 7.09% 3.48% 9.45% 
            
      
 
Note: This table shows the effect of the changes in sovereign spreads on the changes in bank 
indicators in the period from Q4 2014 to Q2 2020. Column (1) presents the results for the GIIPS 
and column (2) shows the results for the non-GIIPS countries. The dependent variables are the 
following: ∆RWA ratio, the quarterly changes in risk-weighted assets over total assets; 
∆Provisions ratio,  the quarterly changes in provisions over total assets, ∆Fair Value ratio, the 
quarterly changes in gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities at fair value through 
profit and loss over total assets; ∆Trading ratio, the quarterly changes in gains and losses on 
financial assets held for trading and liabilities over total assets; and  ∆log(CDS), the quarterly 
changes in logarithm of bank CDS. For the latter, it was computed the quarterly weighted 
average of 5-year senior unsecured bank CDS spreads in basis points. The selection of the banks 
was based on the Spring 2020 EBA transparency exercise. Table A11 shows the list of the 
banks included. The weighted average was computed for each country with the weights based 
on the banks’ total assets as of end-2019. The independent variable, ∆Spread, is the quarterly 
change in the spread of sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 10-year bond yield. L0 
and L1 represent the contemporaneous value and first lag, respectively, of the explanatory 
variable included in the model. The regressions include country fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at country level. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 





 Table A8:  Relationship between the tier 1 ratio and bank indicators 
 
 
  GIIPS Non-GIIIPS 
 (1) (2) 
      
∆ Tier 1 ratio  
∆ RWA ratio -0.1221 * 0.0417 
∆ Provisions ratio -1.5677 ** 0.1235 
∆ Fair Value ratio -3.2639  0.7884 
∆ Trading ratio 1.7462 ** 1.0750 
∆ log(CDS) -0.0007 *** -0.0033 * 
   
Observations 110 132 
Countries 5 6 
R-Squared 28.27% 7.42% 
      
 
 
Note: This table shows the effect of the changes in bank indicators on the changes in the tier 1 
ratio in the period from 2014 Q4 to 2020 Q2. Column (1) presents the results for the GIIPS 
countries and column (2) shows the results for the non-GIIPS countries. The dependent 
variable, ∆Tier1, corresponds to the quarterly change of consolidated tier 1 ratio. The set of 
independent variables include: ∆ RWA ratio, the quarterly changes in risk-weighted assets over 
total assets; ∆ Provisions ratio,  the quarterly changes in provisions over total assets, ∆ Fair 
Value ratio, the quarterly changes in gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities at fair 
value through profit and loss over total assets; ∆ Trading ratio, the quarterly changes in gains 
and losses on financial assets held for trading and liabilities over total assets; and  ∆ log(CDS), 
the quarterly changes in log bank CDS. For the latter, it was computed the quarterly weighted 
average of 5-year senior unsecured bank CDS spreads in basis points. The selection of the banks 
was based on the Spring 2020 EBA transparency exercise. Table A11 shows the list of the 
banks included. The weighted average was computed for each country with the weights based 
on the banks’ total assets as of end-2019. The regressions include country fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at country level. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 




Table A9: Granger Causality 
 
   
  GIIPS Non-GIIIPS 
 (1) (2) 
      
   




      




   
      
   
Note: This table shows the results of the Granger causality test based on the regressions 
included in Table A6. Column (1) reports the results for the GIIPS and column (2) for the non-
GIIPS countries. Yes implies that according to the panel VAR Granger causality Wald test, 
variable X Granger-causes variable Y. No means that according to the panel VAR Granger 






Table A10: Impulse response functions (IRF) 
 
  GIIPS Non-GIIIPS 
 (1) (2) 
      
Panel A: Impulse ∆ Spread, Response ∆ Tier 1 
Forecast Horizon  
0 -0.0590 0.0019 
1 -0.2250 -0.0523 
2 -0.1626 -0.0291 
3 -0.1895 -0.0371 
4 -0.1781 -0.0345 
5 -0.1830 -0.0354 
6 -0.1809 -0.0351 
      
Panel B: Impulse ∆ Tier 1, Response ∆ Spread 
Forecast Horizon  
0 0.0000 0.0000 
1 -0.1660 0.0061 
2 -0.1025 0.0035 
3 -0.1298 0.0044 
4 -0.1182 0.0041 
5 -0.1232 0.0042 
6 -0.1211 0.0042 
         
 
Note: This table presents the impulse reaction functions (IRF) in the period from Q4 2014 to 
Q2 2020. Panel 1 shows the cumulative IRF when the impulse variable corresponds to ∆Spread, 
which is the quarterly change in the spread of sovereign 10-year bond yields over the German 
10-year bond yield, and the response variable denotes ∆Tier1, which represents the quarterly 
change of the consolidated tier 1 ratio. Panel 2 shows the opposite. Column (1) presents the IRF 
for the GIIPS countries and column (2) shows the IRF for the non-GIIPS countries. The IRF 
confidence intervals are computed using 200 Monte Carlo draws from the distribution of the 



















Table A11: List of banks 
 
 Country Bank 
1 AT Erste Group Bank AG 
2 AT Raiffeisen Bank International AG 
3 AT Bawag 
4 BE KBC Groep 
5 FI Nordea Bank Abp 
6 FR BNP Paribas 
7 FR Groupe Crédit Agricole 
8 FR RCI Banque 
9 FR Société générale 
10 FR Groupe BPCE 
11 DE COMMERZBANK Aktiengesellschaft 
12 DE Deutsche Bank AG 
13 DE Hamburg Commercial Bank AG 
14 DE Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale 
15 DE Bayerische Landesbank 
16 DE DZ BANK 
17 DE Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg 
18 DE Norddeutsche Landesbank 
19 NE Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. 
20 NE ING Groep N,V, 
21 NE ABN AMRO Bank 
22 NE de Volksbank 
23 GR Alpha Bank, S.A. 
24 GR Piraeus Bank, S.A. 
25 GR Eurobank Ergasias 
26 GR National Bank of Greece 
27 IT Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. 
28 IT Banco BPM S.p.A. 
29 IT Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. 
30 IT Mediobanca – Banca di Credito Finanziario S.p.A. 
31 IT UniCredit S.p.A. 
32 IT Unione di Banche Italiane S.p.A. 
33 IE AIB Group plc 
34 PT Banco Comercial Português, S.A. 
35 PT Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A. 
36 ES Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. 
37 ES Banco Santander, S.A. 
38 ES Banco de Sabadell, S.A. 
39 ES Bankinter, S.A. 
40 ES CaixaBank, S.A. 
 
Note: This table is a list of the banks included in the Spring 2020 EBA transparency exercise 
that have 5-year senior unsecured CDS quotes available as of September 2020. The list also 




Table A12: Summary Statistics  
 
Panel A: 2009 – 2012 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
                     
Sovereign CDS overall 953.72 2445.81 46.00 25422.81 N =    1037 
 between  1350.93 244.27 3369.48 n =       5 
 within  2129.06 -2311.72 23007.05  T-bar =  207.4        
Bank CDS overall 523.18 521.97 60.72 3099.28 N =     861 
 between  375.50 233.42 1115.57 n =       5 
 within  391.44 -439.99 2506.89 T-bar =   172.2        
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) overall 0.68% 12.30% -58.94% 58.02% N =    1031 
 between  0.82% -0.10% 2.06% n =       5 
 within  12.28% -60.32% 56.64% T-bar =   206.2        
∆ Log(Bank CDS) overall 0.64% 12.04% -50.65% 80.44% N =     842 
 between  0.29% 0.44% 1.10% n =       5 
 within  12.03% -50.93% 79.97% T-bar =   168.4        
              
Panel B: 2013 - 2016        
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
                     
Sovereign CDS overall 381.31 633.17 39.27 7891.44 N =    1001 
 between  509.07 85.37 1286.01 n =       5 
 within  443.56 -504.42 6986.74 T-bar =   200.2        
Bank CDS overall 470.14 620.99 66.30 5782.88 N =    1029 
 between  463.99 151.31 1274.89 n =       5 
 within  459.27 -505.28 4978.13 T-bar =   205.8        
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) overall -0.34% 10.26% -81.70% 146.26% N =     989 
 between  0.27% -0.72% -0.12% n =       5 
 within  10.26% -81.92% 146.04% T-bar =   197.8        
∆ Log(Bank CDS) overall 0.06% 9.86% -94.20% 85.50% N =    1008 
 between  0.45% -0.35% 0.77% n =       5 
 within  9.86% -94.09% 85.62% T-bar =   201.6 
              
              
Panel C: 2017 - 2020        
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
                     
Sovereign CDS (bp) overall 170.76 180.37 19.99 1094.17 N =     783 
 between  142.13 40.04 393.20 n =       5 
 within  122.51 -123.86 871.72 T-bar =   156.6        
Bank CDS (bp) overall 286.07 369.09 33.69 2050.96 N =     975 
 between  371.28 67.75 943.81 n =       5 
 within  160.74 -28.31 1393.21 T-bar=     195        
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) overall -0.64% 9.04% -33.50% 63.67% N =     767 
 between  0.97% -2.32% 0.20% n =       5 
 within  9.02% -33.11% 63.93% T-bar =   153.4        
∆ Log(Bank CDS) overall -0.36% 7.90% -84.93% 45.18% N =     970 
 between  0.23% -0.77% -0.20% n =       5 
 within  7.90% -84.98% 45.11% T-bar =     194 
                     
 
Note: This table includes summary statistics on bank and sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) 
with respect to the GIIPS countries for three reference periods (2009-2012, 2013-2016 and 
2017- Q3 2020). Bank CDS is the weighted average bank CDS in basis points, Sovereign CDS 
is sovereign CDS also basis points, ∆ Log(Bank CDS) is the weekly logarithm change in bank 




Table A13: Summary Statistics  
 
Panel A: 2009 – 2012 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
                     
Sovereign CDS overall 84.66 60.80 16.94 405.85 N =    1254 
 between  38.17 43.45 144.42 n =       6 
 within  49.82 -28.26 346.09 T-bar =     209        
Bank CDS overall 163.38 81.66 50.38 490.00 N =    1201 
 between  49.87 102.45 232.32 n =       6 
 within  67.31 31.06 422.81 T-bar = 200.2        
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) overall -0.15% 11.25% -52.78% 42.78% N =    1248 
 between  0.28% -0.52% 0.25% n =       6 
 within  11.24% -52.97% 43.14% T-bar =     208        
∆ Log(Bank CDS) overall -0.05% 8.67% -35.59% 48.62% N =    1194 
 between  0.21% -0.29% 0.30% n =       6 
 within  8.67% -35.94% 48.28% T-bar =     199        
              
Panel B: 2013 - 2016        
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
                     
Sovereign CDS overall 33.40 14.61 12.43 88.01 N =    1248 
 between  11.15 21.38 47.47 n =       6 
 within  10.48 12.44 74.76 T-bar =     208        
Bank CDS overall 95.82 40.19 36.01 255.73 N =    1254 
 between  32.06 64.19 157.40 n =       6 
 within  27.54 41.59 201.55 T-bar =     209        
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) overall -0.23% 6.44% -32.15% 41.98% N =    1236 
 between  0.13% -0.37% -0.01% n =       6 
 within  6.44% -32.22% 42.05% T-bar =     206        
∆ Log(Bank CDS) overall -0.19% 6.95% -26.66% 30.20% N =    1248 
 between  0.21% -0.57% -0.01% n =       6 
 within  6.94% -26.84% 30.02% T-bar =     208 
              
              
Panel C: 2017 – 2020 Q3 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
                     
Sovereign CDS overall 17.51 7.79 7.88 69.41 N =    1010 
 between  5.35 14.25 27.05 n =       6 
 within  6.39 6.69 59.87 T-bar = 168.3        
Bank CDS overall 57.68 25.00 18.98 146.26 N =    1170 
 between  21.07 33.74 79.63 n =       6 
 within  15.96 20.78 124.31 T-bar = 195        
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) overall -0.57% 7.12% -50.86% 65.34% N =     996 
 between  0.33% -1.11% -0.27% n =       6 
 within  7.11% -50.48% 65.23% T-bar = 166        
∆ Log(Bank CDS) overall -0.21% 9.02% -45.37% 94.92% N =    1164 
 between  0.21% -0.40% 0.16% n =       6 
 within  9.02% -45.20% 94.55% T-bar = 194 
                     
 
Note: This table includes summary statistics on bank and sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) 
with respect to the non-GIIPS for three reference periods (2009-2012, 2013-2016 and 2017- Q3 
2020). Bank CDS is the weighted average bank CDS in basis points, Sovereign CDS is 
sovereign CDS also basis points, ∆ Log(Bank CDS) is the weekly logarithm change in bank 




Table A14: The Sovereign-Bank Feedback Loop 
 
  GIIPS Non-GIIIPS 
 
2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020  2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS)             
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS)       
L1  0.0700 *** -0.2407 ** 0.1635 *** 0.0232 -0.1581 *** -0.0098 
L2  0.0427 -0.1580 *** 0.1159 *** -0.0638 *** -0.0633 * 0.1223 *** 
∆ Log(Bank CDS)       
L1  -0.2528 *** -0.0134 -0.0190  -0.1188 *** 0.1641 *** 0.1072 * 
L2  -0.0216 0.0638 * 0.0080  0.1199 *** 0.0432 *** 0.0603 ** 
ECT (t-1) 8.41E-06  -3.15E-05  -6.49E-06  -3.89E-04  9.67E-05 6.69E-06 
 ** ***  ***   
       
∆ Log(Bank CDS)             
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS)       
L1  0.1243 ***  0.0321 0.1146 * 0.0835 *** 0.0010 -0.0246 
L2  0.0731 * -0.0505 0.1207 *** -0.0103 -0.0039 0.1249 *** 
∆ Log(Bank CDS)       
L1  -0.1450 *** -0.0135 0.0484 -0.1352 *** -0.1350 ** -0.0261 
L2  -0.0744 -0.0232 0.0097 0.0773 *** -0.0458 0.0371 
ECT (t-1) -1.25E-05  -2.63E-05  -5.68E-05 -4.04E-04  -2.17E-04  -8.21E-04  
 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
                     
Observations 793 899 738 1174 1206 966 
Countries 5 5 5 6 6 6 
Hansen’s J statistic 1.08E-31 9.42E-32 9.19E-32 3.63E-31 2.56E-31 6.55E-32 
              
 
Note: This table shows the results of panel autoregressions, whose dependent variables denotes 
the sovereign credit risk and the bank credit risk, during three periods - 2009-2012, 2013-2016 
and 2017- Q3 2020. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the results for the GIIPS countries and 
columns (4), (5) and (6) show the results for the non-GIIPS countries. ∆Log(Bank CDS) is the 
weekly logarithm change in bank CDS and ∆Log(Sovereign CDS) is the weekly logarithm 
change in sovereign CDS. The regressions also include the lagged error correction term (ECT). 
L1 and L2 represent the first and second lags, respectively, of the dependent variables included 
in the model. Standard errors are clustered at country level. ***, **, and * indicates statistical 









Table A15: Granger Causality 
 
    
Panel A: GIIPS  
 
2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 Q3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) does not Granger-
cause ∆ Log(Bank CDS) 
Yes Yes Yes 
*** *** *** 
∆ Log(Bank CDS) does not Granger-cause ∆ 
Log(Sovereign CDS) 
Yes Yes No 
*** ***  
    
        
Panel B: Non-GIIPS 
 
2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 Q3 
 (1) (2) (3)     
∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) does not Granger-
cause ∆ Log(Bank CDS) 
Yes No Yes 
***  ** 
∆ Log(Bank CDS) does not Granger-cause ∆ 
Log(Sovereign CDS) 
Yes Yes No 
*** ***  
    
        
Note: This table shows the results of the Granger causality test based on the regressions 
included in Table 14. Panel A reports the results for the GIIPS and Panel B for the non-GIIPS 
countries. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the results for three periods, 2009-2012, 2013-2016 
and 2017- Q3 2020, respectively. Yes implies that according to the panel VAR Granger 
causality Wald test, variable X Granger-causes variable Y. No means that according to the panel 


















Table A16: Impulse response functions (IRF) 
 
  GIIPS  Non-GIIIPS 
 
2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020  2009-2012 2013-2016 2017-2020 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Impulse: ∆ Log(Sovereign CDS), Response: ∆ Log(Bank CDS) 
Forecast Horizon      
0 0.0709 0.0494 0.0424 0.0464 0.0220 0.0296 
1 0.0762 0.0521 0.0547 0.0491 0.0191 0.0271 
2 0.0782 0.0449 0.0681 0.0510 0.0182 0.0369 
3 0.0771 0.0460 0.0720 0.0508 0.0185 0.0366 
4 0.0771 0.0467 0.0743 0.0511 0.0185 0.0382 
5 0.0772 0.0463 0.0751 0.0510 0.0185 0.0383 
6 0.0772 0.0463 0.0755 0.0510 0.0185 0.0385 
              
Impulse: ∆ Log(Bank CDS), Response: ∆ Log(Sovereign CDS) 
Forecast Horizon      
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1 -0.0225 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0082 0.0107 0.0089 
2 -0.0227 0.0045 -0.0010 0.0010 0.0104 0.0135 
3 -0.0215 0.0033 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0091 0.0148 
4 -0.0213 0.0025 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0093 0.0156 
5 -0.0214 0.0029 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0094 0.0158 
6 -0.0215 0.0029 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0093 0.0160 
              
       
 
 
Note: This table presents the impulse reaction functions (IRF) during three periods - 2009-2012, 
2013-2016 and 2017- Q3 2020. Panel 1 shows the cumulative IRF when the impulse variable 
corresponds to ∆Log(Sovereign CDS), which is the weekly logarithm change in sovereign CDS 
and the response variable denotes ∆Log(Bank CDS), which represents the weekly logarithm 
change in bank CDS. Panel 2 shows the opposite. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the results 
for the GIIPS countries and columns (4), (5) and (6) show the results for the non-GIIPS 
countries. The IRF confidence intervals are computed using 200 Monte Carlo draws from the 
distribution of the panel VAR model with robust errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
